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SLOUCHING TOWARDS AUTONOMY: 
REENVISIONING TRIBAL JURISDICTION, 
NATIVE AMERICAN AUTONOMY, AND 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN INDIAN 
COUNTRY 
Joseph Mantegani* 
Native American women face rates of sexual violence far beyond those 
experienced by any other race. But when those women live on reservations, 
their own tribes are restricted in their authority to protect their members. A 
maze of criminal jurisdiction overlies Indian country, one that depends on 
the location of the crime, the agreements a particular tribe has with local or 
federal authorities, the applicable federal jurisdictional statutes, and the 
offender’s race. 
Since Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe in 1978, tribes have not had 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes on their 
reservations. Rather, tribes must rely on state or federal law enforcement to 
investigate and prosecute any crime committed by non-Indians. Congress has 
chipped away at the prohibition, but the fact remains: in no other place in 
America is a perpetrator’s race the determining factor in whether they can 
be prosecuted by the community most impacted by their offense. 
This lack of jurisdiction and tribal sovereignty takes on a disturbing 
tone in the context of sexual violence against women. Congress’s attempts to 
remedy the endemic issue have been piecemeal, paternalistic, and wholly 
inadequate. Even though the issue is still on their mind—there are several 
pieces of pending legislation addressing sexual violence in Indian Country—
the most important steps have not been taken. 
 
 * Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, J.D. 2021. Many thanks to Professor Cliff 
Zimmerman for guiding my thoughts and sharpening my argument; Teresa Manring, 
Savannah Berger, Cody Goodchild, and the rest of the JCLC staff for thoughtful edits; 
Professors Erin Delaney and Beth Redbird for exposing me to important areas of tribal law 
and sovereignty; and Marisa for support throughout. 
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This Comment explores the jurisdictional backdrop, the most recent 
enacted legislation to address the issue, and currently pending legislation. It 
places that jurisdictional framework in the context of Native American 
communities, describing how tribes’ lack of autonomy exacerbates plights 
that trace back to early colonialism. Finally, it argues that absent adequate 
resource allocation, true tribal autonomy, and a return of tribal criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians by overruling Oliphant, tribes will remain 
treated as second-class in America. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Soon after Diane Millich, a then twenty-six-year-old enrolled member 
of the Southern Ute tribe, married a white man, her life became one filled 
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with “beatings and threats, reconciliations and divorce.”1 At one point, 
“[a]fter one of his beatings . . . he even called the county sheriff himself” in 
a grotesque effort to show how powerless law enforcement was: the state had 
no jurisdiction on the reservation.2 The proper response would seem obvious: 
contact police; obtain a restraining order; permit the justice system to do its 
job. As a white man and non-member of any tribe, though, Ms. Millich’s 
husband was untouchable on the reservation.3 She reached out to tribal 
police, who were powerless to exercise jurisdiction over him; she went to 
federal authorities, who had jurisdiction but chose not to exercise it.4 Federal 
authorities finally asserted their authority, but not until her husband opened 
fire at her workplace, a Bureau of Land Management office, and wounded a 
co-worker.5 
Malign actors purposefully seize on the confusing jurisdictional 
situation on reservations.6 In an interview, the author of a book on 
jurisdiction and sexual violence against native American women described 
the situation: 
In researching my book, I would go into the dark corners of the internet and find chat 
rooms where rapists and pedophiles would talk to each other about how to commit 
crimes. One forum was called “How to rape a woman and get away with it.” Something 
that repeatedly came up was the suggestion that if you’re not a Native person you 
should specifically target . . . Native people on reservations because you can do 
whatever you want there. A tribal police officer could even be present and they couldn’t 
touch you.7 
Diane Millich’s story and the excerpt above show the complex and 
intersectional web of racism, sexism, lack of resources, poverty, and 
 
 1 Jonathan Weisman, Measure to Protect Women Stuck on Tribal Land Issue, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 10, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/11/us/politics/violence-against-women-
act-held-up-by-tribal-land-issue.html [https://perma.cc/W3TC-VFRW]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id.; see also Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978). 
 4 Weisman, supra note 1. 
 5 Id. Diane Millich eventually took center stage at the 2013 signing of the Violence 
Against Women Reauthorization Act (VAWA), which would have provided a jurisdictional 
fix for her particular situation. See Emery Cowan, From Victim to Vocal Advocate, DURANGO 
HERALD (Mar. 25, 2013), https://durangoherald.com/articles/53324 [https://perma.cc/9GS2-
5RLQ] (describing Ms. Millich introducing Vice President Joe Biden at the Act’s signing). 
VAWA is discussed infra Part II.B.2. 
 6 See Jessica Rizzo, Native American Women are Rape Targets Because of a Legislative 
Loophole, VICE (Dec. 16, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bnpb73/na
tive-american-women-are-rape-targets-because-of-a-legislative-loophole-511 
[https://perma.cc/4ADB-2CUV]. 
 7 Id. (quoting Amy Casselman, author of INJUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY: JURISDICTION, 
AMERICAN LAW, AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST NATIVE WOMEN (2016)). 
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jurisdictional gaps affecting Native American women in Indian country.8 A 
commonly cited statistic is that one in three Native American women is raped 
in her lifetime.9 More recent data paints a much starker picture: an average 
of 7.2 in 1000 Native women is raped each year, contrasted with 1.9 in 1000 
for all races.10 A 2010 study, conducted by the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, revealed that “49 percent of Native women report a history 
of sexual violence.”11 
These statistics almost certainly do not reflect the true extent of the 
problem. Experts in the field feel that “federal statistics represent at best a 
very low estimate.”12 Anecdotal data also reveal a pervasive, universal 
impact on Native American women.13 And there is another factor that 
distinguishes crimes of sexual violence committed in Indian country from 
those committed elsewhere: 90% of Native women who are raped are victims 
of someone of another race.14 
In the United States, Native American women constitute 1.8% of the 
missing persons list, despite being 0.8% of the population—a figure that is 
inevitably “low, given that many tribes don’t have access to the [FBI’s 
National Crime Information Center] database.”15 When localized, the figures 
become more striking. In Montana, Native women are 3.3% of the 
population, and 30% of the missing girls and women list.16 North Dakota’s 
 
 8 Throughout this Comment, I use the term “Indian country” to refer to land on 
reservations. A fuller, statutory, definition of “Indian country” is found at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 
(2012). 
 9 SARAH DEER, THE BEGINNING AND END OF RAPE: CONFRONTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN 
NATIVE AMERICA 1 (2015). That figure, from a 1998 report, is so widespread that President 
Barack Obama cited it ten years after its publication. Id. 
 10 Id. at 4. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. at 5. 
 13 See id. (“Through my work in Native communities, I have heard more than once, I don’t 
know any woman in my community who has not been raped.”). 
 14 Id. at 6; see also Ronet Bachman, Heather Zaykowski, Christina Lanier, Margarita 
Poteyeva, & Rachel Kallmyer, Estimating the Magnitude of Rape and Sexual Assault Against 
American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN) Women, 43 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 199, 
211–12 (2010) (reporting survey results that show 88% of African-American victims reported 
a same-race offender, 76% of white victims, and only 33% of AIAN victims. Moreover, the 
AIAN numbers are potentially overreported because the survey grouped Asian-Americans 
with AIAN offenders). 
 15 Sharon Cohen, Montana Woman’s Disappearance 1 of Many Native American Women 




 16 Id. 
2021] REENVISIONING TRIBAL JURISDICTION 317 
Fort Berthold Reservation illustrates the crisis’s root causes: the lack of tribal 
jurisdiction on reservations, and the Indian country oil boom, such as the 
boom on the Bakken formation17—which is located in part on Fort 
Berthold.18 Deer and Warner point to “man camps,” large, temporary camps 
of transient, often non-Indian, oil workers as a major cause for skyrocketing 
violent crime rates, including sex trafficking.19 
Consider this in the context of the practical, day-to-day realities of life 
and law enforcement in Indian country. As an example, the Fort Berthold 
reservation, home to around 7,300 people,20 covers 980,000 acres21—roughly 
the size of Rhode Island. The reservation has a police force of twenty officers, 
and at times, only two are on duty.22 Prosecutorial shortages—the tribe has 
one prosecutor—caused one judge to dismiss 5,000 cases.23 It’s a small 
wonder that some believe “you can do whatever you want there.”24 The lack 
of tribal autonomy, paired in part with the lack of resources and the vastness 
of many reservations, has contributed directly to the missing and murdered 
indigenous women crisis. 
And the crisis is not abating. In January 2020, sixteen-year-old Selena 
Not Afraid’s body was found a mile from the rest stop where she had 
disappeared; it took law enforcement three weeks to find her body.25 A few 
months before that, eighteen-year-old Kaysera Stops Pretty Places had gone 
 
 17 Sarah Deer & Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Raping Indian Country, 38 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 31, 74–75 (2019) (“During the past fifteen years, Native women in the United 
States have found themselves in significant physical danger, which is correlated with an 
increase in contemporary extractive industries. For example, since the onset of the Bakken oil 
boom, the number of assault cases in North Dakota increased by over 82%.”). 
 18 Id. at 76 n.258. 
 19 Id. at 75 n.254. The Bakken boom is not the sole cause of the overall crisis, but it stands 
as a useful example of the following principle: when large numbers of unaccountable, 
temporary residents flood reservations, violent crime follows. 
 20 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, My Tribal Area, https://www.census.gov/tribal/?st=38&aianih
h=1160 [https://perma.cc/FMX3-JP7L] (last visited July 29, 2020). 
 21 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, Fort Berthold Agency, INDIAN AFFS., 
https://www.bia.gov/regional-offices/great-plains/north-dakota/fort-berthold-agency 
[https://perma.cc/EF2K-4MEH] (last visited July 29, 2020). 
 22 Sari Horwitz, Dark Side of the Boom, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2014/09/28/dark-side-of-the-
boom/?utm_term=.03c9abad8d4c [https://perma.cc/H6FR-4HJR]. 
 23 America by the Numbers: Episode Four: Native American Boomtown (PBS television 
broadcast), https://www.pbs.org/video/america-numbers-native-american-boomtown/ [https:/
/perma.cc/MLS6-URCS]. 
 24 Rizzo, supra note 6. 
 25 Nick Martin, The Cyclical Crisis of Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women, NEW 
REPUBLIC (Jan. 22, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/156263/cyclical-crisis-missing-
murdered-indigenous-women [https://perma.cc/J8BE-7CLA]. 
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missing in Hardin, Montana, a town that borders the Crow Reservation in the 
Eastern plains of the state not far from where Not Afraid disappeared.26 Two 
days later, her body turned up, allegedly wrapped in plastic, in the backyard 
of a home less than a mile from the Hardin courthouse.27 
Not Afraid, Stops Pretty Places, and many other women represent the 
terminal stage of this endemic problem, one that like any scourge is best 
eradicated before it manifests. The missing and murdered indigenous women 
are an extreme end of the spectrum of violence against women. But there are 
earlier points on this spectrum that, if addressed, can stem the violence 
experienced by indigenous women. In other words, any attempt to stop the 
missing and murdered indigenous women crisis cannot focus on the missing 
and murdered alone; it must also focus on the role of daily violence against 
women and the lack of power tribes have to protect their most vulnerable 
citizens. The root causes of the crisis in Indian country—racism, sexism, 
cultural genocide—are entrenched, and this Comment neither attempts to nor 
proposes fixes for those root causes. This Comment does, however, argue 
that limitations on autonomy and jurisdiction prevent tribes from protecting 
their own citizens and exacerbate these systemic problems. 
Part II addresses the jurisdictional backdrop in Indian Country. Section 
A introduces tribal sovereignty and describes the statutory and common-law 
background that gave rise to modern tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians. Section B examines two recent Congressional Acts that have 
attempted to remedy the levels of violence faced by Native American women 
by granting tribes increased jurisdiction. Section C then examines currently 
pending legislation that attempts to remedy gaps left from the earlier 
legislation. 
Part III draws attention to how this jurisdictional background and 
history of legislation impacts culture, daily life, and law enforcement on 
today’s reservations. Section A describes the endemic nature of sexual 
violence against Native American women, particularly in the context of 
colonialism, and explains how that history drives the need for increased 
autonomy. Sections B and C analyze legislative shortcomings, explain how 
prior jurisdictional legislation has continued to fail Native American women, 
 
 26 Addie Slanger, Family Seeks Answers After Crow Woman’s Death, MONT. KAIMIN 
(Sept. 27, 2019), http://www.montanakaimin.com/news/family-seeks-answers-after-crow-
woman-s-death/article_e5056126-e170-11e9-8e87-a7221b9818d4.html [https://perma.cc/LE
2X-E5M6]. 
 27 Id.; Julia Jones & Sara Sidner, Grieving Native American Families Shamed Law 
Enforcement Over Missing Women and Won Action from President Trump, CNN (Feb. 27, 
2020, 7:32 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/27/us/montana-missing-murdered-women-
task-forces-sidner/index.html [https://perma.cc/4FKW-F7KL]. 
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and propose solutions. Specifically, Congress must overturn Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe, properly fund tribal law enforcement, and allow 
tribal courts to operate as any others would. 
I. MAPPING JURISDICTION & LAW ENFORCEMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
A. SOVEREIGNTY AND THE JURISDICTIONAL BACKDROP 
In Indian country, any criminal investigation is hampered by the fact 
that the race of both the victim and the suspect determine which authority—
tribal, state, or federal—has criminal jurisdiction over the case. This way of 
determining jurisdiction has its roots in both jurisdictional statutes and 
common law decisions. Several pieces of legislation have further muddied 
this jurisdictional confusion, primarily the Major Crimes Act,28 Public Law 
280,29 and the Indian Civil Rights Act.30 Hovering over all these statutes is 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,31 
which held that Indian tribal courts do not have “criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians.”32 Each statute and decision has modified tribal jurisdiction to 
varying degrees. However, the import of these actions cannot be fully 
appreciated without first understanding the history of tribal sovereignty. 
1. An Introduction to Tribal Sovereignty 
The history of tribal sovereignty is one of erosion, ongoing since the 
country’s founding. The Constitution contains two references to Indian 
tribes, both of which allude to sovereignty. First, it states that tribes are not 
taxed;33 and second, it assigns Congress the power to regulate commerce with 
the Indian tribes.34 The latter power has been construed to grant Congress 
plenary power over tribal affairs.35 
Early Supreme Court decisions tentatively upheld tribes’ sovereign 
status, but also emphasized Congress’s importance in tribal life. In Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia,36 the Marshall Court declared tribes to be dependent 
 
 28 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2013). 
 29 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2010). 
 30 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–41 (2014). 
 31 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
 32 Id. at 195. 
 33 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 34 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8, cl. 3. 
 35 Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (“[T]he central 
function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to 
legislate in the field of Indian affairs.”) (citations omitted). 
 36 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
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nations whose relationship to the United States “resembles that of a ward to 
his guardian.”37 And one year later, in “the most important decision in federal 
Indian law,”38 Worcester v. Georgia,39 Marshall made clear that there was no 
role for states to play in tribal relations, and that tribes’ relationship with the 
federal government did not “strip [tribes] of the right of government” and 
end their sovereignty.40 
For years, Congress exercised its power through treaties with tribes, as 
one nation dealing with another. But in an 1871 appropriations bill, Congress 
abolished tribes’ ability to make treaties.41 After striking this blow to 
sovereignty, Congress drove in the knife in 1887 with the Dawes Act, which 
remained in force until 1934.42 The Dawes Act set in motion the allotment 
era, which aimed to “shatter the tribally held land base.”43 Under allotment, 
tribal territory was broken up into discrete land plots, with individual plots 
granted in trust to individual Indians.44 Any land left over after allotment was 
deemed surplus and became available for sale to all—including non-
Indians.45 Not surprisingly, the land allotted to Indians tended to be the worst 
available.46 Two-thirds of Indian land disappeared into white hands during 
allotment.47 
Allotment ended with the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,48 but its 
effects—loss of land, splintered Indian groups, and a checkerboard plot of 
land ownership that commingled white landholders with Indian allottees—
 
 37 Id. at 17. 
 38 Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture 
of Indian Tribal Authority over Non-members, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1999). 
 39 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
 40 Id. at 560–61. 
 41 Appropriations Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871) (codified 
at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1988)). At least one Justice on today’s Court feels that the 1871 Act ended 
tribal sovereignty altogether. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 (2004) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he 1871 Act tends to show that the political branches no longer considered 
tribes to be anything like foreign nations. And it is at least arguable that the United States no 
longer considered the tribes to be sovereigns.”). 
 42 Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race, Membership, and Tribal Sovereignty, 87 
WASH. L. REV. 1041, 1065–67 (2012). 
 43 Id. at 1067. 
 44 Id. at 1068. 
 45 Id. at 1067–68. 
 46 Natsu Taylor Saito, Asserting Plenary Power over the “Other”: Indians, Immigrants, 
Colonial Subjects, and Why U.S. Jurisprudence Needs to Incorporate International Law, 20 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 427, 440 (2002) (citations omitted). 
 47 Id.; see also Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 12 (1995). 
 48 Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, § 1, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5101 (2018)). 
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remained.49 The Indian Reorganization Act, however, permitted tribes to 
organize governments and write constitutions, allowing them to exert some 
authority over their own affairs. But since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has 
chipped steadily away at that authority. Today, tribes have no criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians,50 cannot regulate hunting and fishing by non-
members on fee-simple land owned by non-members within their own 
reservations,51 have no jurisdiction over disputes between non-members on 
state highways running through reservations,52 and cannot tax non-members 
on fee-simple land owned by non-members.53 As the repetition of “non-
members” in this non-exhaustive list makes clear, tribes continue to lack 
control over tribal lands. 
This history undergirds any discussion of tribal criminal jurisdiction 
because tribes’ lack of sovereignty prevents them from protecting their own 
citizens. This Section and the next continue to discuss, in more granular 
detail, the ways in which this sovereignty has been chipped away in the 
criminal jurisdiction context. 
2. Major Crimes Act 
The Major Crimes Act, passed in 1885, permitted federal criminal 
jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country for certain enumerated crimes.54 
Today, those crimes include, among others, murder, manslaughter, 
kidnapping, incest, felony assault, arson, and burglary.55 The Act was passed 
in direct response to the Supreme Court’s 1883 decision in Ex parte Crow 
Dog,56 in which the Supreme Court overturned the federal conviction of 
Crow Dog for the murder of Spotted Tail on the Sioux reservation (in present-
day South Dakota). In that case, a tribal court ordered that Crow Dog pay 
restitution to Spotted Tail’s family, in accordance with the tribe’s system of 
 
 49 See Royster, supra note 7, at 46 (“Like most tribes, the Crow Tribe of Montana had 
been subject to the allotment program: tribal lands had been allotted; surplus lands had been 
sold; and considerable land had passed into non-Indian ownership, leading inevitably to a 
significant non-Indian presence within the Crow Reservation. As a result of the allotment 
years, by 1981 more than one-quarter of the Crow Reservation was held in fee by non-
Indians.”). 
 50 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978). 
 51 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566–67 (1981). 
 52 Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997). 
 53 Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 647 (2001). 
 54 CARRIE E. GARROW & SARAH DEER, TRIBAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 87–88 
(Jerry Gardner ed., 2004). 
 55 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
 56 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
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punishment.57 The federal government, finding this insufficient, charged 
Crow Dog with the murder and tried him in a federal district court, which 
convicted him.58 Ex parte Crow Dog overruled the federal conviction and 
held that in Indian country, only tribes had jurisdiction over Indians.59 
Congress quickly dispensed with this holding by passing the Major Crimes 
Act.60 
In a blow to tribal sovereignty, the Act granted concurrent federal and 
tribal jurisdiction over its enumerated crimes, even when those crimes only 
involved Indians and occurred inside tribal borders.61 While the Act did not 
strip tribes of any of their jurisdiction, it represented an encroachment on 
tribes’ ability to exercise their autonomous right to govern. If nothing else, 
the Major Crimes Act made clear that the federal government did not trust 
tribal justice. 
3. Public Law 280 
Seventy years later, Congress further encroached on tribal sovereignty 
with Public Law 280.62 Passed in 1953, the law transferred both civil and 
criminal jurisdiction in Indian country from federal to state authorities in six 
states, while simultaneously refusing to provide those states with the 
resources to carry out their new responsibilities.63 Before Public Law 280, 
the federal government could prosecute cases if a tribe did not (or could not). 
After Public Law 280, the ability to prosecute was turned entirely over to the 
governments of states that enacted it. At the time of passage, enactment was 
mandatory in Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and 
 
 57 Kenneth Factor, Tightening the Noose on Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction: Duro v. Reina, 
27 TULSA L.J. 225, 229 (1991). 
 58 DEWI IOAN BALL, THE EROSION OF TRIBAL POWER: THE SUPREME COURT’S SILENT 
REVOLUTION 26 (2016). 
 59 See 109 U.S. at 571–72. 
 60 James Winston King, The Legend of Crow Dog: An Examination of Jurisdiction Over 
Intra-Tribal Crimes Not Covered by the Major Crimes Act, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1479, 1487–88 
(1999). 
 61 GARROW & DEER, supra note 54, at 87. 
 62 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1162 (2018) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2018)). 
 63 Id.; see also Vanessa J. Jimenez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State 
Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1657 (1998) (“The [six states] 
received no federal subsidies to ease the financial burden of their new responsibilities, were 
precluded from taxing reservation lands to raise their own revenues, and received jurisdiction 
without tribal consent.”). 
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Wisconsin.64 Notably, these six states held “359 of the over 550 federally 
recognized tribes and Native Villages.”65 
Other states could adopt Public Law 280 piecemeal. Idaho, for example, 
accepted Public Law 280 only for seven discrete crimes.66 After Public Law 
280, depending on the crime and the state, jurisdiction was split between 
tribal, state, and federal authorities, with both concurrent and exclusive 
jurisdiction regimes. And this was one of the simpler jurisdictional schemes 
in modern Indian country.67 
But Public Law 280 failed to provide funding for the states that assumed 
mandatory jurisdiction, leaving these state police departments with larger 
constituencies, larger geographical jurisdictions, and the same amount of 
money.68 With relations between counties and reservations often strained, the 
pressure that the Act put on states served only to make a halfway solution 
even worse.69 Indeed, upon the Act’s passage, President Eisenhower issued 
a press release lamenting the lack of tribal autonomy provided by the bill. 
Through his press secretary, he said: “The failure to include in these 
provisions a requirement of full consultation in order to ascertain the wishes 
and desires of the Indians . . . was unfortunate.”70 He further noted that the 
Act, in certain situations, prevented Native Americans from self-governing, 
though his qualms were outweighed by the fact that he saw the law as 
“another step in granting complete political equality to all Indians in our 
 
 64 18 U.S.C. § 1162. Of these six states, several have specific reservations carved out and 
exempted from the concurrent jurisdiction requirement. 
 65 Jimenez & Song, supra note 63, at 1634. 
 66 ANGELIQUE WAMBDI EAGLEWOMAN & STACY L. LEEDS, MASTERING AMERICAN INDIAN 
LAW 60 (2d ed. 2019); Idaho Code Ann. § 67-5101 (West 2019). 
 67 For example, after the Tribal Law and Order Act and the Violence Against Women 
Reauthorization Act, see infra Part II.B, an Indian sexual assault victim could report her 
attacker to any of tribal, state, or federal authorities depending on several factors. These factors 
included whether the attack happened on a reservation and whether her attacker was Indian or 
non-Indian. If her attacker was non-Indian, jurisdiction depended on whether the attack was 
in a Public Law 280 state and whether her reservation had tribal law enforcement. 
 68 EAGLEWOMAN & LEEDS, supra note 66, at 60; see also Jimenez & Song, supra note 63, 
at 1657 (“These states received no federal subsidies to ease the financial burden of their new 
responsibilities, were precluded from taxing reservation lands to raise their own revenues, and 
received jurisdiction without tribal consent.”). 
 69 See Jimenez & Song, supra note 63, at 1636–37 (“[M]embers of Indian tribes 
in Public Law 280 states suffer both abuses of authority by state governments and a lack of 
law enforcement responsiveness. For example, in Alaska, tribal justice systems struggle to fill 
the vacuum caused by the retreat of federal law enforcement and the state’s inability or 
unwillingness to assume its Public Law 280 responsibilities.”). 
 70 Press Release of Statement by the President, James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the 
President (Aug. 15, 1953). 
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nation.”71 Oddly, Congress’s goal in shifting jurisdiction from federal to state 
authorities in certain states is not clear,72 and Eisenhower apparently held out 
enough hope that Congress’s lack of clarity did not dissuade him from 
signing on. 
4. Indian Civil Rights Act 
The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA),73 part of the Civil Rights Act of 
1968, mandated that tribal courts abide by certain Bill of Rights protections 
and restricted the punishments that they could issue.74 In its most recent 
version, the Act imposed a limit of up to one year in jail and a $5,000 fine on 
tribal sentences of Indian offenders, in addition to requiring tribes to—among 
other things—provide public defenders, ensure speedy trials, and allow 
federal writs of habeas corpus.75 Effectively, tribes were no longer permitted 
to “hand down felony sentences.”76 Years later, the Tribal Law and Order 
Act of 2010 (TLOA), discussed in Part II.B.1, gave tribal courts the power to 
impose more severe punishments. The Act expanded the statutory sentencing 
and fine limitations for tribal courts that met due process minimums to three 
years imprisonment and a $15,000 fine.77 But even when regulating 
intratribal crime, tribal punishment was still limited. 
After the TLOA, the ICRA was again amended in 2013.78 These 
amendments created “special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction,” which 
permits participating tribes to exercise limited criminal jurisdiction over non-
members who (1) live in their Indian country, (2) are employed in their Indian 
country, or (3) are a spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner of either an 
enrolled member of the tribe, or a member of a different tribe who lives in 
the participating tribe’s Indian country.79 
 
 71 Id. 
 72 Jimenez & Song, supra note 63, at 1658 (“The problems caused by Public Law 280 
directly result from its ambiguous legislative history, imprecise drafting, and lack of an 
express statement of the statute’s objective.”). 
 73 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–04. 
 74 See EAGLEWOMAN & LEEDS, supra note 66, at 49. 
 75 Id. at 49–50; 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a)(6), 1303. When Congress originally passed the 
ICRA in 1968, it permitted “six months’ imprisonment and not more than $500 in fines ‘for 
conviction of any one offense.’” Seth Fortin, The Two-Tiered Program of the Tribal Law and 
Order Act, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 88, 91 (2013). 
 76 Fortin, supra note 75, at 90. 
 77 Id.; 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b). 
 78 See infra Part II.B.2. This time, the amending act was the Violence Against Women 
Reauthorization Act. 
 79 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B). 
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In short, the ICRA’s passage in 1968 allowed for a bit more tribal 
autonomy. Its subsequent amendments in 2010 and 2013 continued to tinker 
with autonomy, in places expanding it while simultaneously conditioning it. 
But any exercise of tribal autonomy still required adherence with external 
limitations—including constitutional safeguards—on tribal justice systems. 
But those external limitations operated more as a cudgel than a check: 
Congress did not see the Bill of Rights alone as a sufficient protector against 
tribal process. Indians, Congress felt, needed more oversight than the 
Constitution. 
5. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe 
But the biggest barrier to tribal autonomy is the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Oliphant.80 In that case, Oliphant—a white non-member of the 
Suquamish Tribe who lived on their reservation—“was arrested by tribal 
authorities during the Suquamish’s annual Chief Seattle Days celebration and 
charged with assaulting a tribal officer and resisting arrest.”81 After 
arraignment in the tribal court, Oliphant applied for habeas corpus in federal 
court, arguing the tribe had no jurisdiction over non-Indians.82 Both the 
district court and the Ninth Circuit disagreed.83 But in a sweeping decision, 
the Supreme Court reversed both courts and declared that tribes have no 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.84 
Practically speaking, the decision forbade tribes from exercising any 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.85 The effect of this, for our purposes, 
is that if a non-Indian rapes an Indian woman on Indian land, even if there is 
no question of guilt, the tribe must rely on either state or federal officials to 
carry out any punishment. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist concluded 
that “Indian tribes do not have inherent jurisdiction to try and to punish non-
Indians.”86 The Court reasoned that because criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians was “‘inconsistent with [tribes’] status as dependent nations,’ [that 
 
 80 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
 81 Id. at 194. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 194–95; see also Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 1976) (“If 
tribal members cannot protect themselves from offenders, there will be powerful motivation 
for such tribal members to leave the Reservation, thereby counteracting the express 
Congressional policy of improving the quality of Reservation life.”). 
 84 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212. 
 85 Sarah Deer, Toward an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Rape, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
121, 128 (2004). 
 86 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212. 
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jurisdiction was] extinguished when the United States was founded.”87 To 
permit tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians would be 
“inconsistent with the founders’ great concern for citizens’ personal 
liberties.”88 The reasoning is much-maligned,89 but a full criticism of the case 
is beyond the scope of this Comment.90 
An understanding of Oliphant, more so than any other piece of the 
jurisdictional puzzle, is crucial to understanding the erosion of tribal 
sovereignty. The Suquamish had provided a “fully functioning Western-style 
court system” to Oliphant, but this was nonetheless insufficient to the 
Supreme Court.91 Oliphant treats tribes as permanent outsiders: even when 
they have acquiesced to the standards prescribed by federal law, they remain 
untrustworthy. This result inevitably raises the question of what level of 
“civilizing” can “trump the enduring myth of Native savagery.”92 
The decision has also left tribes helpless in the face of non-Indian 
criminals. Until subsequent statutes chipped away at the jurisdictional bar in 
narrow situations,93 Oliphant served to “strike[] directly at the heart of a 
tribe’s ability to protect itself.”94 And the decision still does this in many 
criminal situations. Whereas every other American community can empower 
its police force with the authority to protect it, tribes cannot.95 
 
 87 Peter C. Maxfield, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe: The Whole is Greater than the Sum of 
the Parts, 19 J. CONTEMP. L. 391, 398–99 (1993). 
 88 Id. at 399. 
 89 See id. at 396 (“The Court’s justification for scaling back Indian sovereignty is even 
more troubling than the holding itself.”). 
 90 See, e.g., Sarah Deer & Mary Kathryn Nagle, Return to Worcester: Dollar General and 
the Restoration of Tribal Jurisdiction to Protect Native Women and Children, 41 HARV. J.L. 
& GENDER 179, 212–38 (2018) (criticizing Oliphant for, among other things, its reliance on 
the questionable precedent of Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823)); Larry Cunningham, 
Deputization of Indian Prosecutors: Protecting Indian Interests in Federal Court, 88 GEO. 
L.J. 2187, 2195 (2000) (“Scholars criticized Justice Rehnquist’s opinion as a ‘novel departure 
from the basic tenet of Indian law . . . that Indian tribes retain inherent sovereignty over 
internal affairs absent express abrogation by Congress.’”); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The 
Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White 
Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219, 267–74 (1986) (analyzing Oliphant 
through the lens of how much latitude the federal government grants tribes to develop non-
Western practices). 
 91 AMY L. CASSELMAN, INJUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY: JURISDICTION, AMERICAN LAW, 
AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST NATIVE WOMEN 38 (2016). 
 92 Id. 
 93 See infra Part II.B. 
 94 Carol Chiago Lujan & Gordon Adams, U.S. Colonization of Indian Justice Systems: A 
Brief History, 19 WICAZO SA REV. 9, 19 (Fall 2004). 
 95 Id. 
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B. RECENT JURISDICTIONAL EXPANSION 
Unsurprisingly, this patchwork jurisdiction has drawn attention. 
Congress has attempted, on several occasions, to address the jurisdictional 
issues that contribute to the shocking rates of violent crime against Native 
women, targeting both day-to-day violence and the missing and murdered 
indigenous women crisis. Two primary statutes took on the issue, one passed 
in 2010 and one in 2013; both amended the Indian Civil Rights Act. The 
Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 (TLOA) increased sentencing limits, while 
2013’s Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act (VAWA) provided the 
first steps away from Oliphant. Both statutes have been active long enough 
at this point to permit evaluation of their efficacy, and more importantly, a 
clear view of where they fall short. 
1. Tribal Law & Order Act 
In 2010, Congress took a tentative step towards increased tribal 
autonomy by passing the TLOA. The law grants more power to tribal law 
enforcement and prosecution teams, attempts to simplify jurisdiction, and 
includes measures directed specifically at assisting Native women.96 But 
many of these improvements are conditioned. For example, tribes must 
provide counsel to indigent defendants and other such protections in order to 
avail themselves of the Act’s increased sentencing limits, a costly 
proposition.97 The Act provides some funding, but it is typically inadequate 
and poorly distributed.98 As a result, tribes often must find some other source 
of funding or simply provide inadequate services.99 
One of TLOA’s “most important and controversial provisions” is its 
grant of sentencing authority increases to some tribes.100 The increases allow 
tribes that offer adequate due process to criminal defendants to treble the 
 
 96 Samuel D. Cardick, The Failure of the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 to End the 
Rape of American Indian Women, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 539, 564–67 (2012). There are 
four specific measures that assist Indian women: a directive to create teams to “focus on 
combating sexual violence offenses against Indian women,” specialized training, a directive 
to form standardized protocols and sexual assault policies, and a required inspection of Indian 
Health Service facilities to determine how effective their “ability to collect, maintain, and 
secure evidence of sexual assault” is. Id. at 566–67. 
 97 Fortin, supra note 75, at 96–97. 
 98 Id. at 97 (“Evidence is strong that tribes either do not know money is available or are 
using nominally available funds for other purposes.”). 
 99 Id. at 97–99. Some creative solutions include partnering with a nearby law school to 
provide indigent defense, as Washington’s Tulalip Tribes did with the University of 
Washington, id. at 98, and taking advantage of gaming revenue. Id. at 99. 
 100 Gideon M. Hart, A Crisis in Indian Country: An Analysis of the Tribal Law and Order 
Act of 2010, 23 REGENT U. L. REV. 139, 172 (2010). 
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ICRA’s sentencing limits. Now, they can sentence defendants to three years’ 
imprisonment, and issue fines of up to $15,000.101 The required due process 
protections included that tribal judges be admitted attorneys and that tribal 
courts provide public defenders to criminal defendants.102 These may seem 
rudimentary, but they are costly. The latter requirement obviously requires 
money, and while the TLOA included some federal grants that provided 
funding for public defenders, those grants were minuscule compared to 
grants that were aimed elsewhere, generally at more punitive measures.103 
The focus on “solutions” like building new jails made plain that tribal 
autonomy in sentencing was not a focus of the Act.104  
The TLOA creates a paper solution: in response to a crisis, the Act 
provides funding for tribal law enforcement training and construction of jails. 
But the offenders arrested by those police and placed in those jails cannot be 
adequately handled by the overburdened tribal justice system. Everyone can 
see the construction of a new jail, and feel that their concerns are being 
addressed, but the TLOA’s solution is directed at everyone but the victims. 
Even its name—“Law and Order Act”—conjures images of police 
crackdowns, ones whose object is jailing criminals rather than helping 
victims. 
In essence, the TLOA gives tribes a mirage of self-determination with 
one hand, while simultaneously reining in their ability to protect their own 
citizens with the other. But some tribes may be reluctant to participate in the 
TLOA’s requirements, either due to a lack of resources or for reasons of 
autonomy, like a desire (or mandate) to “maintain[] . . . ways of life that 
predate the Constitution.”105 This is the difficulty with the TLOA’s half-
measures: legally speaking, they make tribes neither fully American, nor 
fully sovereign; rather, they place tribes in a kind of jurisdictional purgatory. 
We are too late in the game to start over and reestablish tribes as 
independent nations able to fully exercise their criminal (and civil) 
jurisdiction. But given the history of colonialism and cultural genocide, some 
semblance of independence and sovereignty must emerge. In the way that 
 
 101 Id. at 172–73. 
 102 Id. at 173. 
 103 Fortin, supra note 75, at 97–98. 
 104 Id. The other grants permitted in the TLOA were for drug enforcement, police training, 
“grants to build jails, grants for delinquency prevention, and grants to improve information 
sharing systems between law enforcement agencies.” Id. 
 105 Id. at 99–100. As an example of the mandate, the Cherokee Constitution contains an 
oath that all officers must take. Officers promise to “do everything within [their] power to 
promote the culture, heritage and traditions of the Cherokee Nation.” CHEROKEE CONST. art. 
XIII. 
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Illinois can arrest and prosecute a non-Illinois resident who commits a crime 
within its borders, tribes should, at the very least, have the same authority.106 
The TLOA was a start. But after its passage, questions remain. Should tribes 
have uncapped prosecutorial and sentencing authority, allowing them to 
exercise full control of their land? To what degree should tribal, state, and 
federal cooperation be required? Should such cooperation even occur? 
2. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act 
Several years after the TLOA, Congress more directly addressed 
violence faced by Native women. The Violence Against Women 
Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA 2013) amended the ICRA in a way that 
permitted, for the first time since Oliphant, criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians.107 But the classes over whom this “special domestic violence 
criminal jurisdiction” (SDVCJ) permits jurisdiction are quite narrow. Only 
those who live or work in the relevant Indian country, or who are intimately 
involved with members of the relevant tribes, fall within it.108 The Act does 
not allocate SDVCJ out of a concern for the practical realities of policing 
Indian country. Rather, it allocates this jurisdiction on grounds of inherent 
tribal sovereignty.109 Thus VAWA 2013 makes clear that Congress can 
restore the inherent sovereignty that Oliphant stripped, and it is willing to 
exercise that authority, albeit in a piecemeal manner. 
Like with the TLOA, there are guardrails on the expansion of tribal 
criminal jurisdiction under VAWA 2013. First, the perpetrator must be a non-
Indian with some tie to the tribe, and the offense must fall into “any of the 
following categories: domestic violence, dating violence, or violations of 
 
 106 There are certainly examples of tribal and state authorities cooperating that show that 
concurrent jurisdiction—that is, two sovereigns having jurisdiction over a single area—is a 
workable solution. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Tom Cole et al. in Support of Petitioner at 
4, McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020) (No. 18-9526) (“For more than two decades, 
the [Chickasaw and Choctaw] Nations’ sovereign authority within their Reservations and 
commitment to the cooperative exercise of that authority have provided the framework for the 
negotiation of agreements that provide legal certainty, economic stability, and a better quality 
of life for all Oklahomans.”). 
 107 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4). 
 108 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B); see also Dayna Olson, Protecting Native Women from 
Violence: Fostering State-Tribal Relations and the Shortcomings of the Violence Against 
Women Act of 2013, 46 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 821, 822 (2019). 
 109 BALL, supra note 58, at 180–82 (“The House thought it was ‘noteworthy’ in Oliphant 
that the Court suggested that Congress had the constitutional authority to restore inherent tribal 
sovereignty for them to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians. . . . Under [SDVCJ], inherent 
tribal sovereignty allows tribes to prosecute Native Americans and non-Indians suspected of 
domestic violence.”). 
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protection orders.”110 Because VAWA 2013 focuses on pre-existing 
relationships, a notable omission here is random “stranger” violence. For 
example, if a Native woman is attacked by a man she meets out at night or 
by an attacker hiding in the proverbial alleyway, tribes cannot prosecute the 
perpetrator.111 Also omitted are so-called quality-of-life crimes. Drugs, drunk 
driving, vandalism—all are outside the scope of SDVCJ. Tribes remain 
reliant on state or federal authorities for maintaining general order. 
Second, VAWA 2013 requires that tribes provide procedural 
safeguards. The offender has a right to a jury, which can include non-Indians, 
and any convictions handed down under SDVCJ are subject to federal habeas 
review.112 The Act also contains a catch-all provision, affording an SDVCJ 
defendant “all other rights whose protection is necessary under the 
Constitution of the United States in order for Congress to recognize and 
affirm the inherent power of the participating tribe to exercise special 
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over the defendant.”113 
Thus, VAWA’s 2013 reauthorization took a step towards addressing 
daily, endemic violence against women.114 Further, VAWA 2013 and the 
TLOA mark a move towards tribal autonomy. By allowing tribes to exercise 
their own forms of criminal punishment and jurisdiction, they directly 
confront Congress’s fear in passing, and maintaining, the Major Crimes 
Act.115 VAWA’s 2013 reauthorization also marked the first legislative 
attempt at eroding Oliphant,116 and perhaps opens the door for further 
chipping away at the decision. But both Acts miss the mark in significant 
ways. 
C. RECENT FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
VAWA 2013 and the TLOA left gaps and open questions. First, the 
allocation of SDVCJ when the victim is the “spouse, intimate partner, or 
 
 110 EAGLEWOMAN & LEEDS, supra note 66, at 55. 
 111 See Olson, supra note 108, at 838 (“The SDVCJ has been dubbed a ‘partial’ Oliphant 
fix, in that child abuse, elder abuse, and sexual assault by a stranger—unless either one of 
these crimes violates a preexisting restraining order—are not covered by the expanded 
criminal authority of the tribes.”). 
 112 EAGLEWOMAN & LEEDS, supra note 66, at 55. 
 113 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(4). 
 114 See, e.g., EAGLEWOMAN & LEEDS, supra note 66, at 55; BALL, supra note 58, at 181–
82. 
 115 See, e.g., United States v. Other Medicine, 596 F.3d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The 
Major Crimes Act permits the federal government to prosecute Native Americans in federal 
courts for a limited number of enumerated offenses committed in Indian country that might 
otherwise go unpunished under tribal criminal justice systems.”) (citations omitted). 
 116 BALL, supra note 58, at 181–82. 
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dating partner” of a non-Indian, while admirable, fails to account for the fact 
that Native women are “more likely to be victims of assault and rape/sexual 
assault committed by a stranger or acquaintance rather than an intimate 
partner or family member.”117 That is to say, their attackers do not fall under 
SDVCJ. Second, the Acts raise issues of allocation of power. In order for 
tribes to punish offenders beyond the TLOA or VAWA 2013 ceilings, they 
must resort to agreements with state or federal authorities and rely on those 
authorities to prosecute. This becomes especially problematic when tribes do 
not trust local or federal governments.118 Third, the Acts did little to remedy 
the underreporting of missing Native American women, which often occurs 
simply due to lack of access to or incompatibility with state and federal 
databases.119 The underreporting problem is so widespread that “[a]n Urban 
Indian Health Institute [study] found that of 5,712 reported missing Native 
women and girls in 2016, only 116 had been logged in [the Department of 
Justice’s] database.”120 
In response to these gaps, several pieces of federal legislation have been 
proposed in recent years, in particular Savanna’s Act121 and the Not Invisible 
Act.122 Each proposed Act attempts to remedy the crisis by addressing 
distinct gaps—primarily in communication and jurisdiction—but each 
inevitably falls short. Their shortcomings manifest in different ways, each of 
which comes back to a single common thread: failure to adequately address 
underlying causes. 
1. Savanna’s Act 
One of the gaps Congress has tried to address is an information gap. 
Savanna’s Act was initially introduced in 2018 and was unanimously 
 
 117 STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME: A BJS 
STATISTICAL PROFILE, 1992-2002 v (2004), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aic02.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G2A4-K7WS]. 
 118 This includes several sub-issues: tribes are often reluctant to trust governments who 
have broken agreements with them in the past, they sometimes perceive state or federal 
officials as deprioritizing issues affecting tribes, and it can undermine the spirit of a tribe to 
be forced to rely on outsiders to preserve their own safety. 
 119 S. Hrg. 116-67 S. 227, S. 288, S. 290, S. 982, & S. 1853: Hearing Before the Comm. 
on Indian Affairs, 116th Cong. 29–39 (2019) (statement of Hon. Lynn Malerba, Secretary, 
United South and Eastern Tribes Sovereignty Protection Fund) [hereinafter Malerba 
statement]. 
 120 Id. at 37. 
 121 S. 227, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 122 S. 982, 116th Cong. (2019). 
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approved by the Senate, but the House never voted on it.123 Senator Lisa 
Murkowski reintroduced the bill in 2019 with identical text to the original, 
and with input from several Native authorities.124 The Act had clear support: 
its bipartisan Senate sponsors included each senator from several states with 
high proportions of Native American citizens, and its House equivalent 
included all four Native American members of the House as cosponsors.125 
Its second iteration passed both houses of Congress, and the President signed 
it into law on October 10, 2020.126 It directs the Department of Justice to train 
employees on the entry of Native American women into missing and 
unidentified persons databases, conduct outreach to tribes on how to enter 
missing women into databases, develop guidelines for missing persons cases, 
train and assist tribes on implementing the guidelines, report statistics on 
missing and murdered indigenous women, and have the FBI include gender 
in its annual statistics of missing and murdered persons.127 Practically 
speaking, the bill is aimed at data collection—a necessity, given the severe 
underreporting of missing Native women.128 
Committee hearings addressing the legislation also laid plain numerous 
data-collection issues. Databases used by tribes do not necessarily match 
those used by state or federal governments.129 For example, tribal affiliation 
is not a data entry field in state and federal databases.130 Additionally, there 
are problems with limited resources, merging databases, and simply 
providing training on proper data entry.131 And even if all these issues are 
resolved, “[s]ome tribal governments may be hesitant to broadly share tribal 
law enforcement data, due to troubled histories with local and state law 
enforcement officers and tribal residents.”132 Ultimately, Savanna’s Act puts 
 
 123 Jenna Portnoy & Felicia Sonmez, Before Leaving Office, Rep. Bob Goodlatte Blocked 




 124 S. 1942, 115th Cong. (2018); S. 227, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 125 H.R. 2733, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 126 134 Stat. 760 (2020). 
 127 H.R. 2733, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 128 Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Data Governance and Informational Privacy: Constructing 
“Indigenous Data Sovereignty”, 80 MONT. L. REV. 229, 254 (2019). 
 129 S. Hrg. 116-67 S. 227, S. 288, S. 290, S. 982, & S. 1853 Hearing Before the Comm. on 
Indian Affairs, 116th Cong. 13 (2019). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Tsosie, supra note 124, at 255. 
2021] REENVISIONING TRIBAL JURISDICTION 333 
all the parties in a room. But it does little to address the underlying factors 
that have kept the parties apart for so long. 
2. Not Invisible Act 
The Not Invisible Act, which also became law on October 10, 2020, 
seeks to mend those trust gaps and act as a complement to Savanna’s Act.133 
It directs the Bureau of Indian Affairs to designate an official to take charge 
of tracking missing and murdered Native Americans.134 That official will 
coordinate with outside groups who have experience dealing with various 
tribes to provide training.135 Lastly, it creates an advisory committee aimed 
at addressing “violent crime within Indian lands and of Indians” that makes 
non-binding recommendations to both the Secretary of the Interior and the 
Attorney General.136  
The latter directive is the primary sticking point with the Act, as some 
feel that it fails to properly create interagency communication between the 
Department of the Interior and the Department of Justice.137 Another view is 
that the Act will “provide a mechanism for Tribal Nations, Native people, 
and others with relevant expertise to advise the federal government on 
combatting violent crime within Indian Country and against Native people, 
addressing some of the historical trauma that leads to crime in Indian 
Country.”138 Data collection, of course, is crucial to establish the scope of the 
problem. But the Act fails to prescribe how this data will be used. Seeing the 
full scope of a problem is one thing; providing the necessary jurisdictional, 
financial, and self-determinative steps to help resolve that problem is another. 
3. Other Federal Legislation 
There are several ancillary pieces of legislation currently pending in 
Congress. One aims to include crimes against children and law enforcement 
officers in the SDVCJ.139 Another’s goal is to improve the infrastructure of 
missing persons databases so as to improve coordination.140 And a third bill 
 
 133 134 Stat. 766 (2020). 
 134 Id. § 3(a)(1). 
 135 Id. § 3. 
 136 Id. § 4. 
 137 S. Hrg. 116-67 S. 227, S. 288, S. 290, S. 982, & S. 1853 Hearing Before the Comm. on 
Indian Affairs, 116th Cong. 20–28 (2019) (testimony of Michelle Demmert, Chief Justice of 
Central Council of Tlingit and Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska Supreme Court) [hereinafter 
Demmert statement] (“However, as written, the burden falls primarily on DOI to meet the 
requirements of the law and there is very little included to ensure that DOJ comes to the table 
as a full partner; as a matter of practice, it can be extremely difficult to require meaningful 
coordination and collaboration across Departments, and this must be a joint responsibility.”). 
 138 Malerba statement, supra note 116, at 37. 
 139 S. 290, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 140 S. 1853, 116th Cong. (2019). 
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seeks to amend VAWA 2013’s SDVCJ, striking “domestic violence” and 
instead expanding SDVCJ to include “domestic, dating, or sexual violence, 
sex trafficking, or stalking.”141 Of these, the latter—called the Justice for 
Native Survivors of Sexual Violence Act (“Justice Act”)—is the most 
interesting, and perhaps the most necessary. 
As previously discussed, a major loophole in VAWA 2013 is the failure 
to address violence from strangers, as it focuses instead on intimate partner 
violence.142 The Justice Act strikes directly at that loophole: it would expand 
tribal criminal jurisdiction to cover assault from a stranger, stalking, 
harassment, and other such crimes that SDVCJ fails to address.143  Moreover, 
the ICRA currently defines both dating and domestic violence as just that: 
violence.144 But the Justice Act proposes to expand that definition: both 
dating and domestic violence would not require violence, but rather would 
“include[] any violation of the criminal law of the Indian tribe that has 
jurisdiction over the Indian country where the violation occurs.”145 This is 
crucial for autonomy: under the Justice Act, tribal law, rather than a non-
tribal body, defines the reach of special tribal criminal jurisdiction. Defining 
the laws that govern a tribe’s land goes straight to the core of autonomy. And 
if it passes, when a non-Indian violates tribal law in Indian country, SDVCJ 
applies—whether or not they act with violence. 
Furthermore, the Act recognizes that words matter by proposing to 
rename SDVCJ. No longer reserved for domestic violence, the name would 
become Special Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction.146 Though a seemingly small 
change, the new name carries heavy symbolic weight. While tribal authority 
would remain subject to the statutory sentencing limits, calling it tribal 
criminal jurisdiction reflects expanded autonomy. The jurisdiction could 
extend to sex trafficking, for example,147 or to related conduct—that is, any 
other violation of tribal law that occurs in connection with a crime falling 
 
 141 S. 288, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019). 
 142 BALL, supra note 58, at 181–82. 
 143 S. 288, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019). 
 144 25 U.S.C. §§ 1304(a)(1), (2). 
 145 S. 288, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019). 
 146 Id. §§ 2(2)(D), (F). 
 147 Sex trafficking was not defined in the ICRA, and the Justice Act proposes a broad 
definition covering “recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting, providing, obtaining, 
advertising, maintaining, patronizing, or soliciting by any means a person; or . . . benefiting, 
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within Special Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction.148 Even with the ICRA’s 
sentencing limits at play, the ability to prosecute non-Indians arrested for 
additional forms of sexual violence is a step forward. 
II. REENVISIONING TRIBAL JURISDICTION IN THE SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
CONTEXT 
With this backdrop of jurisdiction and legislation, this Comment turns 
now to where to go from here. This Part will evaluate the efficacy of the 
existing legislation, as well as the strength of currently pending legislation. 
A shortcoming of both the existing statutory framework and the pending 
legislation is that they focus too much on the terminal stage of day-to-day 
violence against women—the missing and murdered indigenous women 
crisis—and inadequately address the day-to-day violence itself. Exacerbating 
this shortcoming is the inability of tribes to exercise their own sovereign 
authority. In order to adequately address these flaws, Congress must first 
overrule Oliphant, then turn its attention to proper allocation of funding to 
tribal police and judicial authorities. As a final step, tribes must hold 
sovereign authority over their own land and in protection of their own 
citizens. But before turning to criticisms and proposals, this Part will 
contextualize sexual violence against Native American women and its effect 
on Indian communities. 
A. THE ROOTS & CONTINUATION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
In early America, rape was a tool of colonialism.149 This colonial 
foundation is central to understanding the insidiousness of sexual violence 
against Indian women. Rather than an assertion of individual power or an 
isolated act of violence, rape of Indian women serves as “a continuation of 
the colonization process.”150 Properly contextualizing the impact that sexual 
violence has had on Native American communities requires an examination 
of its history. 
That examination reveals that Native communities handled violence 
against women in a radically different manner than European societies.151 
Women were autonomous, protected, and played a central role in Native 
American society.152 Colonial explorers would subsequently weaponize rape 
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in order to upend the role of Native women in both their own communities 
and in the newly created Euro-centric one.153 As explained further below, that 
weaponization would remain, codified into statute, and undergird the 
devaluation of Indian women. A small extension of jurisdictional autonomy 
cannot undo this history. 
1. Sexual Violence Before and During Colonialism 
Unlike the European travelers who would eventually encounter Native 
Americans, Native peoples “actually allowed women to make autonomous 
sexual choices”—much to the surprise (and horror) of the early Europeans.154 
Obviously, there were numerous Native societies, and an exhaustive study is 
better suited for a book than this Comment. But the general tenor is clear, 
and it was one of striking female autonomy. In 1722, for example, “a 
Frenchman[] wrote that young Native girls ‘are the mistresses of their own 
bodies,’” and a Lakota woman wrote that “[a]mong the Lakota, the woman 
owned her body and all the rights that went with it.”155 The Cherokee 
believed that “[t]he sovereignty of Indian Tribes is connected to the safety of 
Native women.”156 And the Cheyenne taught that “[t]he Nation shall be 
strong so long as the hearts of the women are not on the ground.”157 
Written records of Native treatment of sexual violence rely almost 
exclusively on European recordings of incidents, punishments, and general 
attitudes. This impacts any study in two ways. First, it omits Native voices 
from the telling of their history. With few written criminal codes and no 
volumes of case law outlining their treatment of offenders, we often must 
experience Native cultures through the eyes of strangers. This leads to the 
second way: we know that discussion of the progressive nature of tribal 
jurisprudence is not based on some idealized, “noble savage” stereotype of 
Native American societies. If these explorers could paint Native societies as 
savages, they would. 
Some tribes, though, do have a traceable legal history. William Bartram, 
a scientist who traveled through Creek Nation territory in 1773—before any 
written Creek law—observed that he “never saw or heard of an instance of 
an Indian beating his wife or other female, or reproving them in anger or 
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harsh language.”158 One of the Creek Nation’s first criminal codes, from 
1824, specifically outlawed violence against women.159 Notably, for any 
offense violating this particular statute, the victim determined the 
punishment: “what she say it be law.”160 
Other punishments for transgressions are similarly eye-opening, and 
quite distinct from European societies. The Iroquois would not permit any 
man who had sexually assaulted a woman to ascend to a leadership 
position.161 And not only could Native women make their own sexual 
choices, “[i]f [they] did report a rape, they were believed.”162 Not only is this 
a striking difference from today’s America, it was markedly different from 
European societies, where women were treated as “subordinate, at best, or as 
chattel at worst.”163 From this background a major distinction between Native 
societies and European ones begins to emerge, one that continues to 
undergird the crisis of sexual violence against Indian women: to Native 
Americans, sexual violence was an affront to the community as a whole and 
struck at the center of their society. To Europeans, it was effectively a 
property crime. 
Thus it is plain why “[e]ven Europeans who wrote disparagingly about 
Native people noted that Native people abhorred sexual violence.”164 One 
European fur-trader gave the following account of tribal jurisprudence 
around rape: “I have known more than onest thire Councils, order men to be 
putt to Death for Committing Rapes, wh[ich] is a Crime they Despise.”165 
Other 18th century observers noted that unlike other cultures, “Native men 
did not sexually violate prisoners of war.”166 Far from being some idealized 
stereotype, the historical record shows that sexual violence in pre-colonial 
Native societies simply did not rise to the levels of European societies.167 
Colonizers quickly confronted the central role women played in Native 
societies. While searching for new land and resources, they “encountered 
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Native women who were central political actors in the nations that governed 
these resources.”168 Given that these societies were often matrilineal, 
colonizers were forced to contend with women who were not only 
autonomous, but who “controlled and regulated the lands and resources that 
colonizers wanted.”169 This also places the language of colonization, riddled 
as it is with innuendo, in a different light.170 
2. The Enduring Legacy 
Not only did colonizers hold women in lower esteem simply as a matter 
of policy, they took this to extremes with Native women—most likely as a 
method of control and subjugation. Early in colonial history, they often used 
rape as a tool for control of Native peoples.171 Centuries later, in 1909, the 
consequences of that method of subjugation became clear. During a 
Congressional debate that year addressing how to punish sexual violence in 
Indian country, a Representative opined that “the morals of Indian women 
are not always as high as those of a white woman and consequently the 
punishment should be lighter against her.”172 That is, Native women asked 
for it, and their rapists deserved a lesser punishment. 
This belief was codified and remained so for decades. In Gray v. United 
States, several Indian men were arrested and prosecuted for raping a non-
Indian woman.173 The offenders were tried and convicted by a federal district 
court.174 On appeal, the Indian defendants argued that the statute under which 
they were punished was unconstitutionally race-based: the statutory 
punishment for an Indian defendant who raped an Indian woman was “at the 
discretion of the court,” whereas an Indian who raped a non-Indian woman 
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faced a statutory punishment of “death, or imprisonment for any term of years 
or for life.”175 The Ninth Circuit deferred to the legislature: 
“Congress has seen fit to diminish the penalty to be imposed 
upon an Indian who is convicted of rape upon another Indian in 
Indian Country, by enacting the specific provisions contained in 18 
U.S.C. § 1153, which mitigate the penalty that otherwise would be 
imposed under 18 U.S.C., Section 2031 [if the victim was a non-
Indian].”176 
In a perverse distinction from the Oliphant jurisdictional gap, which 
bases jurisdiction on the suspect’s race, the very severity of the crime here 
was distinguished by the victim’s race. Native women were partway citizens, 
calling to mind how tribes must undergo federal supervision without full 
constitutional rights.177 
Native American cynicism towards existing legislative solutions 
(primarily concurrent jurisdiction), then, comes from a lengthy history. 
Given the lack of protection Congress has provided, as described in Gray and 
later embodied in Oliphant, a feeling in Native communities that state and 
federal authorities serve to police rather than protect their communities is 
inevitable.178 This feeling drives the necessity of tribal autonomy: centuries 
of wrongs are not undone by permitting certain complying tribes to exercise 
limited criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians;179 rather, tribes must exercise 
that authority themselves. And, as explained below, recent attempts by 
Congress to address the consequence of these legislative and judicial 
failures—high rates of sexual violence against Native American women—
continue to fall short. 
B. WHERE LEGISLATION FALLS SHORT 
In looking at both recent and proposed legislation, three primary issues 
arise regarding Congress’s attempts to solve the epidemic of violence against 
Native American women. First, the legislation’s focus on missing and 
murdered indigenous women has failed to fully account for the day-to-day 
violence women on reservations face. Second, VAWA 2013’s focus on 
relationship-based violence fails to address the myriad scenarios in which a 
woman is assaulted by someone with whom she has no preexisting 
relationship. Third, the ICRA and TLOA’s limitations on criminal 
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punishment split the baby, in that they subject tribes to traditional federal 
oversight—habeas corpus, constitutional protections for defendants, etc.—
while refusing to extend the freedom to adjudicate to the tribes. The first two 
issues pull in different directions and exacerbate the third issue: a focus on 
missing and murdered women at the expense of day-to-day violence ignores 
a major root cause of the missing and murdered women crisis and distracts 
from non-relationship-based violence against women, and addressing root 
causes is difficult given the institutional limitations imposed by the ICRA 
and TLOA. 
1. Lack of Focus on Day-to-Day Violence Against Women 
Many of Congress’s recent legislative attempts, such as Savanna’s Act, 
focus on the missing and murdered indigenous women epidemic. In 
December 2018, Congress held a hearing on the crisis.180 Alleviating this 
crisis is obviously important—Native American women constitute a 
disproportionate number of the missing person’s list, and structural 
shortcomings put them in a uniquely vulnerable position relative to women 
of other races. But violence against Native American women manifests in 
many different ways, and focusing solely on missing and murdered 
indigenous women obscures the day-to-day violence that inflicts trauma on 
individuals and communities.181 
Native American women are an outlier among racial groups. Unlike 
sexual crimes committed against other racial groups, the vast majority of 
sexual crimes with Native victims are interracial.182 Unlike women of any 
other race, though, Native American victims face a complex jurisdictional 
web that turns not on the nature of the crime, but on the race of the perpetrator 
and the physical location of the crime. The lack of consequences for 
perpetrators can lead to cyclical violence that creates cynicism about the 
justice system’s efficacy, paralyzes communities, and occasionally leads to 
families simply leaving the reservation.183 The psychological toll this can 
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have on a community is made plain by manifestations of trauma, such as the 
finding that “84% of Alaska Native women entering a residential substance 
abuse treatment facility had experienced rape.”184 
The toll of the missing and murdered indigenous women crisis surely 
heightens this trauma. But focusing too much on missing women can result 
in ignoring a major underlying cause: the day-to-day violence and trauma 
women face. Lack of attention to this cause is exacerbated by the 
jurisdictional gaps and limited autonomy tribes can exercise. Instead, women 
must rely on state or federal officials to obtain justice—officials whom 
Native communities often see as policing their reservations while failing to 
protect their citizens.185 
2. SDVCJ’s Shortcomings 
Of the three primary problems with the legislative solutions, the limited 
scope of SDVCJ is the one problem that Congress has explicitly attempted 
to address.186 In the Justice Act, Congress seeks to expand VAWA 2013’s 
SDVCJ to all acts of sexual violence against women.187 There is no condition 
that there be a preexisting relationship between the victim and the 
perpetrator, as there is in VAWA 2013.188 If passed, the Act would also 
permit the limited exercise of tribal jurisdiction—allowing for punishments 
of up to three years for TLOA-compliant tribes or one year for non-compliant 
tribes—over non-members, Indian or not, who violate tribal law in their 
Indian country.189 This would be a tremendous start. However, it still 
proposes a piecemeal solution to an endemic problem. 
Presume a world in which the Justice Act passes in its present form. 
Tribes would enjoy this expanded jurisdiction and be able to take a step 
towards autonomy. They would not, however, be able to address many of the 
crimes that can lead to sexual violence—drug trafficking, drug use, or 
criminal alcohol use (like DUI) by non-Indians, for example—nor would 
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they be able to impose a sentence beyond nine years.190 Further, their police 
and courts would likely see an increase in use, but without a corresponding 
increase in funding.191 There is already a lack of law enforcement in Indian 
country: “[i]n [fiscal year] 2020, Indian Country only had 1.9 officers per 
1,000 residents compared to an average of 3.5 officers per 1,000 residents 
nationwide.”192 And population alone does not tell the whole story—rural 
reservations have a whole set of concerns not present in cities or suburbs. 
Fort Berthold, for example, has 7,300 residents living in a million-acre 
territory.193 While a densely populated city may have three to five officers 
per 1,000 people,194 residents in places like Fort Berthold have 1.9 officers 
per 1,000 people on top of a possible several-hour drive to respond to a call. 
Even the Justice Act, therefore, would do little to permit true autonomy, 
instead reinforcing the reliance tribes have on state and federal authorities to 
assist in law enforcement.195 Tribes often want to preserve traditional 
methods of adjudication, which many times differ from the adversarial model 
we employ in the American system.196 Ideally, traditional tribal justice 
systems would be fully preserved. But given the social and geographic 
reality—dozens of reservations, where non-Indians regularly live and marry 
enrolled Indians—it is unclear how realistic a proposition that is.197 But we 
can easily envision a world in which “tribes seek to take the best of the 
Western model while still focusing on tribal laws, traditions, and values.”198 
To develop such a jurisprudence, tribes must be free to do so, not 
meticulously monitored by federal authorities. 
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3. Statutory Sentencing Limitations 
A third gap left from the active and proposed legislation is the ICRA’s 
statutory limitations on tribal criminal punishment, which were expanded for 
participating tribes by the TLOA.199 The statutory ceilings force American 
criminal systems onto tribes while failing to permit tribes the autonomy to 
operate within those systems as they see fit.200 Again, this is not to make a 
normative argument that tribes should punish crimes more harshly; rather, it 
is to argue that they should have that choice. The statutory ceilings can be 
viewed as a compromise: giving tribes absolute independence may present 
federalism problems, whereas forcing absolute conformity to the American 
justice system calls to mind the wretched history between Native American 
tribes and the federal government. But that compromise does more harm than 
good. Statutory limitations infantilize tribes, prohibiting them from fully 
protecting their citizens, and only reinforce tribal reliance on state and federal 
officials.201 
Under the ICRA, tribes are forced to punish rape (and any other crime) 
as no more than a misdemeanor, bolstering the view that tribes neither could 
nor would exert authority over felonies.202 The TLOA has tripled the 
limitations for complying tribes, allowing three years per crime for up to 
three crimes—so sentence stacking could permit jailing a rapist for a 
maximum of nine years, depending on the number of offenses charged.203 
With the passage of the TLOA, tribes could finally choose to punish rapists 
as felons, something that “almost all sex crimes in American law are 
categorized as.”204 This is slouching towards autonomy, but with strings 
attached: tribes must still to rely on state and federal prosecutors if they want 
to impose sentences above the statutory limits.205 In other words, tribes are 
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allowed to be sovereign, but only in the manner that the federal government 
deems adequate.  
This halfway solution also has downstream effects. Placing tribal 
criminal jurisdiction in such a liminal space has resulted in a jurisdiction “so 
functionally limited that tribes have not been incentivized to build up suitably 
professional and functional criminal justice institutions of their own.”206 This 
could, for example, be a root cause of the TLOA’s seemingly obvious 
condition that a tribal judge must be an admitted attorney.207 Because tribal 
justice was limited, and because some tribes had farmed out law enforcement, 
willingly or not, to state or federal officials, there was little incentive to invest 
resources into developing an autonomous justice system. That lack of an 
autonomous justice system could, in turn, serve as a justification down the 
road for withholding criminal jurisdiction from tribes.208 And the cycle keeps 
spinning. 
C. A LOOK FORWARD: PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
There is no one-size-fits-all solution to the epidemic of sexual violence 
on reservations. However, there are three steps that will significantly help 
tribes exercise their autonomy and protect their most vulnerable members. 
First, Congress must overrule Oliphant to permit full criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians. Second, federal resource allocation must adequately 
support tribal police and courts. Lastly, jurisdictional schemes must reflect 
tribal autonomy—something that will be much easier to accomplish without 
Oliphant blocking the path forward. 
1. Overruling Oliphant 
As long as Oliphant stands, any other attempted solution is stillborn. 
Overruling the decision is the most important step in beginning to address 
sexual violence on Indian reservations. Tribes simply cannot protect their 
members when their jurisdiction over non-Indians is statutorily limited to 
those with significant ties to the tribe.209 The statistics about interracial rape 
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of Indian women and rising crime on certain reservations in the direct wake 
of oil booms are stark reminders that much of what plagues reservations 
today is crime and violence from outsiders,210 yet Oliphant prevents the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction over those outsiders. 
Notably, both federal and tribal officials have decried Oliphant. An 
Assistant United States Attorney wrote that Oliphant “ha[s] a significant 
impact on day-to-day life in Indian country in that [it] affect[s] one of the 
most basic tenets of sovereignty: the ability of a government to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction within its own territory.”211 And in recent hearings in 
front of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, the Chief of the Mohegan 
Tribe testified that recognition of sovereign rights and resolution of the 
violence against Native women crisis “cannot truly be accomplished without 
the full restoration of criminal jurisdiction to our governments through a fix 
to the Supreme Court decision in Oliphant.”212 
Furthermore, Oliphant is the jurisdictional root of many of the problems 
facing law enforcement on reservations.213 While it stands, there is a judge-
made barrier to tribal autonomy. This barrier even prevents tribes from 
protecting their own members, the most basic function of a government. 
When tribes cannot perform that function, it delegitimizes them in the eyes 
of their members, exposes them to opportunistic criminals, and creates a 
cycle of crime and violence that further threatens their autonomy. 
2. Adequate Allocation of Resources 
Second, additional resources will improve tribal law enforcement’s 
efficacy. Tribal police departments are short-staffed, and tribal courts are 
backlogged due to prosecutorial shortages.214 Missing and murdered 
indigenous women are not tracked due to insufficient databases and an 
inability to match tribal records with state and federal ones.215 Because of the 
role that a perpetrator’s race plays in crimes in Indian country, tribal police 
 
 210 See, e.g., Lailani Upham, Oil Booms, So Does Violence, CHAR-KOOSTA NEWS (Dec. 
20, 2018), http://www.charkoosta.com/news/oil-booms-so-does-violence/article_0386cf00-
0949-11e9-a5df-6ba0e817e8a3.html [https://perma.cc/LR33-RJHG]. 
 211 Christopher B. Chaney, The Effect of the United States Supreme Court’s Decisions 
During the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century on Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 14 BYU 
J. PUB. L. 173, 174 (2000). 
 212 Malerba statement, supra note 119, at 11–12. 
 213 See BALL, supra note 58, at 193–202. 
 214 See Malerba statement, supra note 119; America by the Numbers: Episode Four: 
Native American Boomtown (PBS television broadcast Oct. 24, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/
video/america-numbers-native-american-boomtown/ [https://perma.cc/UZ9L-CC7Z]. 
 215 See Demmert statement, supra note 136. 
346 MANTEGANI [Vol. 111 
forces are often faced with the decision of whether to expend scarce resources 
to determine whether they can even investigate.216 
Recall that Fort Berthold, a million-acre reservation, has a police force 
of twenty officers.217 Fort Berthold is lucky in some senses—the reservation 
has a stream of income from the Bakken formation, and a built-in base of 
oilfield workers to patronize its casinos and businesses.218 But not all 
reservations have these revenue streams. For example, Holy Cross, Alaska 
recently received a $185,000 grant from the Department of Justice for the 
hiring and training of a tribal police officer—the community’s first formal 
law enforcement official since 2017.219 It is easy to imagine the predicament 
tribal law enforcement officials face when deciding whether to expend 
meager resources on a case the tribe may not even have jurisdiction over. 
The reasons this is a necessary solution are not merely financial—they 
are also moral. The takeover of vast swaths of land and natural resources by 
the United States has placed the federal government in a position of providing 
“unique legal and moral trust and treaty obligations to Tribal Nations and 
Native people.”220 Moreover, through legislation like the ICRA and the 
TLOA, “the federal government is shifting authority through legislation to 
tribes without concomitantly shifting the resources to make those justice 
systems functional.”221 That is, tribes are being set up to fail. Assignment of 
responsibility without assignment of the resources necessary to assume the 
responsibility is farcical. 
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3. Tribal Autonomy 
Even with Oliphant overruled and tribal police properly funded and 
supported by Bureau of Indian Affairs officials, easing the day-to-day trauma 
requires simplifying the jurisdictional kaleidoscope. As discussed above, 
there is an intricate jurisdictional investigation that must be performed before 
an investigation of the actual crime even begins.222 The necessity of 
determining whether a crime took place on a reservation or off, in 
combination with the ICRA’s statutory sentencing limits, can lead to several 
consequences. Two primary ones are tribes resigning themselves to 
inadequate punishment for people who have committed crimes on their 
reservations and against their people,223 and cross-deputization agreements 
with local or federal officials, which permit “one entity’s law enforcement 
officers to issue citations, make custodial arrests, and otherwise act as 
enforcement officers in the territory of another entity.”224 
Sovereignty requires that tribes have the ability to enforce laws as they 
see fit.225 Half-measures, such as requiring constitutional protections for 
tribal criminal defendants while statutorily capping tribal authority to punish 
those same defendants,226 serve neither the interest of the tribes nor the 
interest of federal and state governments. Tribes inevitably feel as though 
they are subject to a “second-class system of justice.”227 The state 
government can simply back out of a cross-deputization agreement with the 
election of a new local sheriff228—calling to mind a long history of broken 
agreements and lowering the incentive for tribes to enter into such 
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agreements in the first place. In order to have a legitimate solution, tribes 
must have both autonomy and the confidence that a single vote ousting a 
local sheriff cannot upend the law enforcement regime on which they rely. 
Tribes must have authority to protect their own citizens and operate their 
own governments. If federal limitations are placed on their authority, such as 
constitutional protections for defendants and habeas review, those limitations 
should have the same effect on tribal courts as they have on state courts—
operating to keep them within bounds, while still permitting sovereignty. In 
exchange for providing constitutional safeguards in tribal courts, tribes 
should have the power to prosecute people, regardless of race, who commit 
crimes against their members on their land—much the same way an Illinois 
citizen who commits a crime in Indiana can be prosecuted in an Indiana court 
that provides constitutional safeguards and habeas review. Without this, 
tribal authority is impotent.229 
CONCLUSION 
The restrictions on Native American criminal jurisdiction serve to 
constrain the autonomy and self-determination of Indians. But more 
pointedly, they prevent tribes from protecting their members—particularly 
female ones—from sexual violence. The story here is one of gaps: gaps in 
jurisdiction, in trust, and in autonomy. All of these add up to the constant 
drone of violence against women, and to its most visible result, the missing 
and murdered indigenous women crisis. 
The latter crisis is the focus of much of the public’s attention. While it 
certainly requires attention and a solution, focusing exclusively on missing 
and murdered women does little for those facing day-to-day violence 
exacerbated by these gaps. Diane Millich was neither missing nor murdered, 
and Savanna’s Act would not have stopped her husband from assaulting her. 
Day-to-day violence impacts general spirit, inflicts trauma on thousands of 
women and children, and occurs at a much higher rate on reservations than it 
does outside Indian country.230 
The holes left by the TLOA and VAWA’s 2013 reauthorization are not 
properly addressed by pending litigation. Instead of patching Acts that fail to 
address the issue, Congress should instead point its energy towards 
overturning Oliphant, properly funding tribal law enforcement, and 
permitting tribal autonomy by allowing their courts to operate as any others 
would. Absent these fixes, Congress’s attempts to resolve the plague of 
sexual violence in Indian country are bound to be inadequate. 
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